Austerity in the European Periphery : the Irish Experience by Hardiman, Niamh et al.
Hardiman, Niamh and Blavoukos, Spyros and Dellepiane Avellaneda, 
Sebastian and Pagoulatos, George (2016) Austerity in the European 
Periphery : the Irish Experience. Discussion paper. University College 
Dublin, Dublin. , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/66340/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
  
UCD GEARY INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY  
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
Austerity in the European periphery: the Irish 
experience 
 
 
 
 
Niamh Hardiman 
School of Politics and International Relations and  
Geary Institute for Public Policy, 
University College Dublin 
 
Spyros Blavoukos 
Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens 
 
Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda 
School of Government and Public Policy 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 
 
George Pagoulatos 
Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, 
 
 
 
 
 
Geary WP2016/04 
January 28, 2016  
1 
 
Austerity in the European periphery: the 
Irish experience1 
Niamh Hardiman2 
School of Politics and International Relations and UCD Geary Institute for Public 
Policy, University College Dublin 
 
Spyros Blavoukos 
Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece  
 
Sebastian Dellepiane Avellaneda 
School of Public Policy and Government, Strathclyde University, Glasgow, UK 
 
George Pagoulatos 
Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece  
 
 
Abstract: Ireland has come to be seen as an exemplary case of the successful 
practice of austerity, both economically and politically. But these inferences 
would be misleading. The real story about fiscal adjustments in Ireland is more 
problematic, the reasons for recovery are more complex, and the political 
consequences are a good deal more nuanced. This paper sets the Irish 
experience alongside that of the other Eurozone periphery countries. It argues 
that these countries’ recovery prospects depend on the EU economic policy 
framework, but that Ireland’s connections to non-Eurozone economies also 
shape its growth prospects. Political stability is problematic in all the periphery 
countries, with the rise of challenger parties articulating values and priorities 
that may be difficult to accommodate within the current European policy regime. 
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Introduction 
 
Ireland has come to be seen as an exemplary case of the successful practice of 
austerity. Its success in exiting its 2010 loan programme, and doing so early, was 
lauded by the European Commission. Year-on-year GDP growth in 2015 was at 
the top of the EU league with a remarkable reported rate of 6%; job creation was 
buoyant; unemployment was below the Eurozone average of 10.5%. Ireland’s 
experience was in marked contrast with that of the southern European countries 
with which it had recently been closely linked (Brazys and Hardiman 2015 ). 
These outcomes have been attributed to thoroughgoing implementation of the 
austerity measures required by Ireland’s 2010 loan programme, supported by 
strong continuity in two successive governments’ policy stance. In addition, 
Ireland’s experience is taken to indicate that sustained pursuit of fiscal 
retrenchment need not be politically destabilizing or even particularly costly 
politically. But these inferences would be somewhat misleading. The real story 
about fiscal adjustments in Ireland is more problematic, the reasons for recovery 
are more complex, and the political consequences are a good deal more nuanced.  
 
These issues cannot be fully understood without taking account of the wider 
European context of crisis. Many elements of this story are shared with the other 
countries in the Eurozone periphery that have been at the epicentre of the crisis, 
that is, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The terms of adjustment were harsher in the 
periphery than they might have been, had a balanced EU-wide macroeconomic 
policy mix been in place. The severity of the recession varied across the 
periphery; we see variation both in the impact of austerity measures and in the 
prospects for recovery. Ireland does indeed show more signs of recovery than 
the others. But in Ireland as elsewhere, the political consequences of austerity 
have been far-reaching. Early anxieties that the crisis could pose a systemic 
threat to democratic government, analogous to that experienced in much of 
continental Europe during the 1930s, proved unfounded, as the combination of 
welfare buffers and official-level responses – albeit limited and belated – headed 
off the recurring risk of the collapse of the Euro itself. But across Europe, the 
politics of austerity has put representative government under growing pressure. 
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Austerity in the European periphery 
 
The experience of crisis in the European periphery, including Ireland, cannot be 
understood independently of the broader political and economic governance of 
the Eurozone.  
 
Uneven European institutional capacity to respond to the crisis 
 
The institutional framework governing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
constrained the repertoire of policy responses available to national governments 
and intensified the experience of austerity (Wolff and Sapir 2015). Simon Wren-
Lewis, noting that we should draw a distinction between ‘ordinary’ fiscal 
consolidation, and fiscal adjustments that are tantamount to ‘austerity’ policies, 
defines austerity as: 
 
fiscal consolidation that leads to a significant increase in involuntary 
unemployment, or perhaps more formally but less colloquially as leading 
to a noticeably more negative output gap 
        (Wren-Lewis 2015) 
 
So why did Ireland, along with the rest of the European periphery, have to 
experience higher unemployment and a ‘more negative output gap’ than would 
have been required by the need to address the fiscal deficit? The story can be 
traced back to the perverse incentives for the countries of the periphery that 
followed from European Monetary Union. After 2000, they could avail of interest 
rates well below their historic averages. Growth potential made them attractive 
destinations for lending that was unconstrained by any central financial risk 
assessment. The surge of capital into both public and private sector borrowing 
contributed to driving inflation upward, yet governments could not raise interest 
rates to combat this, and were politically constrained in their capacity to control 
the consequences through fiscal policy alone (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2010). 
So when the crisis struck in 2008, these economies were very exposed to the 
risks of a ‘sudden stop’ of financial flows (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012; 
Dellepiane-Avellaneda et al. forthcoming). The collapse of economic activity and 
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plummeting revenues pushed Ireland and Spain into serious fiscal difficulties, 
intensified the public spending problems of the Greek state, and stalled the 
already anaemic economic activity in the Portuguese economy. The fiscal crisis of 
the Eurozone was a consequence of the collapse of the banking system, and not 
itself a primary cause of crisis (Baldwin and Giavazzi 2015). 
 
Early responses to the crisis in 2008/9 had involved a coordinated G20-wide 
fiscal expansion that prevented a slump into depression analogous to the Great 
Depression. However, the exposure of the true scale of Greece’s fiscal problems 
in 2009 and the eruption of its sovereign debt crisis in May 2010 brought about a 
rapid change of course from the European authorities. The ‘unfinished 
architecture’ of the Eurozone (Schmidt 2010) resulted in slow and protracted 
series of attempts to generate sufficient consent, institutional capacity, and 
financial reserves to deal appropriately with the situation. The European 
authorities struggled to respond adequately to the banking sector crisis and its 
fallout for governments’ borrowing capabilities. After Greece, Ireland and then 
Portugal ceased to be able to borrow on international markets, and the 
permanent European Financial Stability Mechanism was only put in place in 
October 2012. An EU framework for resolution of failing banks was not agreed 
until 2014. 
 
At the same time, the widespread yet misleading diagnosis of the Eurozone crisis 
as one of fiscal irresponsibility generated a new commitment at official level to 
control fiscal deficit and debt levels more firmly. From the outset, the Euro had 
been a very lightly governed currency, with no scope for fiscal transfers to 
member states in response to an asymmetrical shock, no overall lender of last 
resort to prevent bank system collapse, and (in principle) no possibility of 
bailout in the event of excessive debt liabilities resulting in a state being cut off 
from international markets. The intention had been to enforce member states’ 
conformity to broad targets of inflation, deficit, and debt levels, through active 
manipulation of fiscal policy at national level. Under the foundational legislation 
governing the Euro, the Commission was already empowered to initiate 
Excessive Deficit Procedures. The Fiscal Compact (that is, the Treaty on Stability, 
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Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union) entered 
into force in January 2013. But by that time, the existential crisis of the Euro had 
abated – not because of the prospect of stricter fiscal rules, but because of the 
ECB’s market-calming assurances in July 2012 that it would ‘do whatever it 
takes’ to protect the Eurozone from collapse (De Grauwe and Ji 2013), followed 
in due course by a programme of monetary expansion or Quantitative Easing 
(QE). 
 
This then was the context within which the European authorities became 
committed to strict enforcement of fiscal rules and strict timetables for deficit 
reduction. These were, in effect, the only continuous policy instruments in 
existence within the Eurozone, and this was the policy area in which it proved 
easiest to introduce stronger central controls. The European authorities were 
therefore committed to enforcing a rapid reduction in fiscal deficits even in the 
depths of recessionary conditions, and in the absence of effective policy 
coordination capable of offsetting the adverse macroeconomic consequences.  
Once again, the European periphery countries were locked into policy 
prescriptions set at EU level; notwithstanding the protections against global 
markets offered by loan agreements, the terms of adjustment were inevitably 
going to produce hardship for the countries worst affected by the crisis. They 
could not respond along the lines of past fiscal adjustments, by devaluing their 
currencies to gain competitive advantage and generate some new growth 
prospects, and allowing inflation to rise to reduce the real burden of debt. The 
full force of relative cost adjustment had to be borne through ‘internal 
devaluation’, that is, in effect, by reducing the living standards within the 
member states concerned. Pursuing retrenchment proved to be particularly 
difficult because it was expressed as a ratio, and a shrinking GDP could cause 
even real gains in fiscal retrenchment to be expressed as deteriorations in the 
overall deficit targets. Even if some measure of fiscal adjustment were indeed 
necessary, the absence of counterbalancing growth-promoting policy measures, 
and the speed with which fiscal retrenchment was required, undoubtedly 
intensified the experience of austerity (Guajardo et al. 2011; IMF 2012).  
6 
 
 
Asymmetrical macroeconomic policy mix 
 
The countries that were subject to loan programmes – Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal, and Spain in respect of its banking sector – were subject to tight 
monitoring of their compliance with austerity measures. To varying degrees, 
they were also subject to additional ‘structural adjustment’ requirements, 
intended to facilitate new growth, in the expectation that supply-side 
liberalisation and deregulation was all that stood between these countries and 
renewed growth. These measures were subject to varying levels of 
implementation because they often proved most destabilizing to those groups, 
especially in the public sector, who were already adversely affected by austerity. 
But in any event, there was little evidence to support the expectation of 
significant growth from reforms such as these in the short or even medium term. 
And yet there were no other mechanisms in place to generate growth: public 
investments were constrained by the fiscal constraints these countries were 
required to observe, and private investments were limited due to the incapacity 
and unwillingness of banks to engage in new lending. 
 
But not all Eurozone member states were subject to these tight constraints. The 
‘core’, northern member states had more fiscal head-room and significantly 
depressed domestic demand, particularly Germany. If the Eurozone were to be 
envisaged as a single economic unit, deflation in periphery countries would have 
warranted inflation levels in Germany and other core economies of well above 
2%, in order to produce an aggregate average inflation performance for the 
Eurozone as a whole of ‘close to but below 2%’, the ECB’s sole target. But 
German political – and public – opinion was highly resistant to this, and near-
deflation persisted in Germany too. German economic performance, ever since 
reunification in 1990, had been strongly export-led, based on sustained 
suppression of domestic demand and intensified export orientation. Figure 1 
shows the consequences. 
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Figure 1: Competitiveness index 
 
Source: European Central Bank 
 
This depiction of the harmonised competitiveness index based on unit labour 
costs shows the relationship between productivity and labour costs within each 
country relative to its own long-term average, over the period between 1995 and 
2012. Wage costs are not the only determinant of competitiveness, of course, and 
the significant deterioration in the relative performance of the periphery 
countries after 2000 was driven primarily by the negative interest rates on 
borrowing that obtained after entry to EMU that were inappropriate to their 
circumstances, particularly in Ireland and Spain. But what is significant about 
this graph nonetheless is its reminder that the performance of individual 
European economies cannot be considered in isolation. Cost repression in 
Germany meant domestic wages were not rising in response to improved 
productivity. The surpluses generated, instead of contributing to additional 
demand across the European economy as a whole, were channelled into savings. 
These savings fuelled the capital flows that further destabilised the periphery 
economies. 
8 
 
The very sudden collapse of domestic living standards in the periphery after 
2008 was also an unnecessarily painful experience, seen in a wider European 
context. In an integrated economy, dearth of demand in one region can be offset 
by its increase in another, facilitated by their common currency. But Figure 2 
shows the highly asymmetrical adjustment required of the Eurozone periphery 
in the absence of increased economic activity in the core. 
 
Figure 2: Asymmetrical macroeconomic adjustment in trade relations 
 
Source: EU Eurostat 
 
The current account balance in the periphery deteriorated very significantly, 
firstly in response to the flow of capital from the core to the periphery during the 
2000s, and then in the depths of the crisis itself. The change in 2009 reflected the 
collapse of domestic demand in the periphery, which is apparent from the flat 
line apparent in the core as a whole, and the positive improvement in Germany’s 
performance, due in part to its greater trade diversification, particularly to China. 
More generally, indeed, it could be noted that EMU gave Germany an added boost 
in pursuing its advantages in high-technology, high value-added production, 
while there were very few incentives or facilities to stimulate the southern 
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European periphery to break out of its traditional niches of low-end production 
and a concentration of activity in non-tradable sectors of the economy. The 
consumption boom and the unproductive housing boom in the periphery during 
the 2000s, associated with unrestrained lending from the core, had further 
reinforced these perverse asymmetries. 
 
IMF research showed that the effects of fiscal retrenchment within the Eurozone 
member states after 2009 had cumulative effects that spread across borders, and 
that the multiplier effect of austerity was a good deal higher than anticipated in 
some of the worst-affected cases (IMF 2012). And yet the European 
Commission’s own new Macroeconomic Scoreboard, intended to track 
dimensions of potentially destabilizing economic performance that had hitherto 
attracted little attention, explicitly permitted a bigger maximum current account 
surplus (+6%, which Germany consistently exceeded since 2012 anyway) 
relative to the largest permissible deficit (a threshold of -4%).  
 
Variations in adjustment 
 
The experience of austerity in the European periphery cannot be understood 
without understanding its relationship to what was happening in the core. At the 
same time, there was a good deal of variation in the experiences of austerity 
across the periphery countries themselves. The economic impact of the 
measures taken depended on a number of factors including the fiscal starting 
conditions of each country, the configuration of its welfare provisions, the 
administrative and implementation capacity of the system, and the recovery 
capacity of the economy.  
 
The fiscal effort each achieved was considerable. As Figure 3 shows, Greece – the 
poorest of the four Eurozone periphery countries and the one with the biggest 
problems of political and administrative capacity – implemented the most far-
reaching change in fiscal balance between 2009 and 2012. 
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Figure 3: Scale of fiscal retrenchment, 2009 - 2012 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2012, Issue 2, 17 December 2012. 
 
The preferred adjustment strategy supported by the official lenders favours 
spending cuts over tax increases; the revenues of the affected countries had in 
any case plummeted in the context of recession. Cuts in public spending may be 
considered more tolerable through the lens of prioritizing deficit reduction and 
limiting damage to output potential. But there are disproportionate 
distributional effects on those who depend on public transfers and public 
services. The social consequences of the austerity measures, implemented in the 
depths of economic crisis and without direct growth-promoting mechanisms, 
were severe. 
 
Among the consequences was a sharp increase in unemployment. Figure 4 shows 
how dramatically this increased after 2008 from relatively low levels during the 
years of steady growth that preceded the crash.  
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Figure 4: Total unemployment rate 
 
Source: EU Eurostat 
 
In Ireland and Spain, some of the increase is attributable to the shock caused by 
the initial collapse of the construction sector. But prolonged recessionary 
conditions, the freeze in bank lending despite extensive recapitalisation, and the 
burden of private debt on households and on non-financial firms alike, resulted 
in a sustained period of stagnation across most of the periphery. Youth 
unemployment typically ran at about twice the average rate in the overall 
economy; in Spain and in Greece, there is little exaggeration in speaking of a ‘lost 
generation’ of youth with restricted employment prospects, limited access to 
welfare supports, and few prospects of independent living.  
 
The distributive effects of austerity were variable across countries. In Ireland, 
the aggregate significance of the measures taken by the Fianna Fáil-Green 
coalition between 2008 and 2010, then the Fine Gael-Labour coalition from 2011 
onwards, is contested. A study conducted in the Economic and Social Research 
Institute analysed ‘policy-induced income losses’ relative to what a ‘neutral’ 
budgetary stance would have yielded between 2009 and 2015. It found 
significant reductions in the income of all households, which were directly 
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attributable to higher taxes and charges and cuts in public services and income 
transfers. These reductions were net of income losses from other sources such as 
unemployment, lower wages, and lower incomes from self-employment. The 
income drop was very similar across most of the income range at about 11%. But 
it was higher among the band of households with the lowest incomes. It was 
highest, at over 15%, in the top income group (Keane et al. 2015), in part 
because of the structure and incidence of taxation in Ireland. Among the lowest 
income groups, the increase in direct taxes and the introduction of new charges, 
combined with cuts in services, resulted in an increase in the incidence of 
deprivation, a measure of income adequacy to meet basic social needs 
undertaken by the Study of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) and reported by 
the Central Statistics Office. The categories particularly at risk were the 
unemployed and one-parent households. Deprivation rates rose from about one-
quarter to half for the lowest income decile, and from almost two-fifths to three-
fifths between 2008 and 2013 for the second-lowest income decile (Farrell 
2015). On an aggregate index of ‘social justice’ including access to health care, 
education, the labour market, poverty prevention, and social cohesion, Ireland 
was among the lowest 10 of the EU28 (Schraad-Tischler 2015). 
 
Ireland’s recovery began to become apparent during 2013 and 2014, with an 
increase in recorded GDP and an expansion in the value of goods and services as 
a proportion of GDP. This was more than just a feature of the way corporate 
profits were declared by the FDI sector in order to minimise their tax liabilities, 
always a problematic feature of Irish economic data because of Ireland’s 
internationally low corporate tax rates (FitzGerald 2013; Henigan 2014). 
Unemployment began to fall as more jobs were created. These are the indicators 
that have led some commentators to believe that the recovery came about as a 
consequence of austerity policies. This interpretation is fully in line with the 
European Commission’s own diagnosis of the most effective pathway to recovery 
in the Eurozone. The conditions for a return to economic growth, it is argued, 
require cutting wage costs to improve competitiveness, which in turn will 
stimulate the demand for exported goods and services – that is, a replication of 
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the German model of export-driven growth through wage and other cost 
repression.  
 
But the inference that austerity caused recovery is not well grounded in the Irish 
case – if anything, it could be argued that recovery came about in spite of 
austerity. It is true, as Figure 1 shows, that Irish competitiveness based on unit 
labour costs showed some relative improvement during the recession. But the 
conditions behind this are more complex than the story of a beneficial ‘internal 
deflation’ might suggest. Firstly, the relative improvement in competitiveness 
began in 2007, before the implementation of any austerity measures, with the 
stalling of the housing boom and the end of the long spell of diverting 
investments into unproductive assets. Aggregate productivity data improved 
because of rising unemployment in the relatively low-skilled, low-value-added 
construction sector.  
 
Secondly, a reduction in the wage rate in the private sector is expected to be one 
of the principal mechanisms behind better export performance, but this did not 
happen in Ireland. The exporting sector is highly concentrated in the foreign-
owned, high-tech sectors that includes production in information and 
communications technology and in pharmaceuticals, and internationally traded 
sectors such as software design, insurance, and other financial services. The 
principal domestic exporting sectors are agriculture and food products. These 
sectors did not suffer relative losses in cost competitiveness during the boom, 
neither did they experience pay cuts during the recession (Breathnach 2010; 
Regan 2015). Employees who experienced pay cuts were mostly in the public 
sector or in construction, all of them non-traded sectors. Ireland’s long 
commitment to supporting sizeable FDI investments resulted in the presence in 
the Irish economy of a leading sector of capital-intensive activities that were 
relatively insensitive to wage-costs. The rate of investment in Ireland on the part 
of foreign multinationals increased during the period of recession. But the 
upturn is mainly attributable to mobile US capital made available by QE, 
incentivised by the continuities in Irish FDI policy rather than by austerity 
(Brazys and Regan 2015). 
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Thirdly, it is true that Ireland’s real effective exchange rate improved in parallel 
with the implementation of austerity measures, as Figure 5 shows.  
 
Figure 5: Real effective exchange rates 
 
Source: Bruegel Dataset 
 
But the most convincing explanation for this does not support the conventional 
austerity argument that better export performance followed from a combination 
of private sector wage-cutting and public sector cost-cutting. Rather, Ireland’s 
export performance is strongly connected to the fate of the British and US 
economies. The relative weakness of the Euro made Irish exports more 
competitive without internal price adjustments. Furthermore, while labour costs 
in the exporting sectors remained stable or increased in Ireland, they increased 
more rapidly among its trading partners (O'Farrell 2015). Since they had control 
over their own monetary and fiscal policies, they were not tied into the sluggish 
performance of the Eurozone economies, so domestic demand in these 
economies was also more buoyant. 
15 
 
Political effects of austerity 
 
The economic crisis exposed new tensions between the need for unified 
European-level policy responses, where national economic needs were very 
diverse. What then were the implications for domestic politics? In the early 
stages of the crisis, it seemed that national governments would manage the crisis 
within the existing framework of debate and without major disruption to 
established party systems. Lindvall, for example, anticipated that the politics of 
conservatism would assert itself at first, as voters sought to restore stability, and 
that this would be followed by a resurgence of Social Democracy to tame the 
markets and reassert distributive priorities (Lindvall 2014). Sure enough, the 
initial elections held during the crisis resulted in changes of government in 
which the established opposition party or parties benefited. Those held 
responsible for implementing unwelcome austerity were punished electorally, 
whether in a shift from left to right (as in Spain and Portugal) or from centre-
right to centre-left (as in Ireland). There seemed to be ‘no general ideological 
shift in response to the Great Recession’ (Bartels and Bermeo 2014, p.12). 
 
But over the years, established political parties found they were coming under 
increased pressure. A new kind of politics began to emerge in the European 
periphery that involved direct mobilisation of disaffected groups, especially 
young people excluded from the labour market, reflecting a more generalised 
dissatisfaction with the available policy solutions (Coelho et al. 2016). In Spain, 
this took the form of the challenger parties Podemos on the left and Ciudadanos 
on the right, taking issue with the mainstream parties’ perceived corruption and 
inability to offer an alternative to austerity. Neither party was as successful as 
their activists had hoped, but they created an unprecedented problem for 
government formation. A further source of fragmentation of the Spanish party 
system followed from the electoral successes during 2015 of the Catalan 
independence movement, which had gained new energy from the impact of 
austerity, and from the resistance of Rajoy’s Partido Popular government to the 
level of regional autonomy required to facilitate change in fiscal priorities. 
Portugal had no new ‘anti-politics’ challenger party, but the outgoing centre-
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right coalition of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats lost its majority in 
2015 to a leftward surge in support not just for the mainstream opposition 
Socialists, but in particular for the smaller, far-left parties that had been excluded 
from government formation until now. As in Spain, no stable majority 
government could be formed, and the Socialists had to resort to building ad hoc 
coalitions to support policy, one issue at a time. The most dramatic collapse of 
the party system took place in Greece. The challenger party SYRIZA came from 
the radical left; it benefited from the all-but-complete collapse in 2012 of the 
mainstream social democratic PASOK and the discrediting of its main rival New 
Democracy – and from the frustrations of Greek voters with the hardships 
imposed in turn by PASOK and New Democracy and mandated by the terms of 
Greece’s loan agreements.  
 
So what were the political consequences of austerity in Ireland in this 
comparative perspective? In broad terms, the trends in Ireland were very similar 
to those in the other periphery countries. The party system was undergoing 
change in the run-up to 2016 elections. The precipitous electoral collapse of 
Fianna Fáil in 2011, from its former long-held role as dominant party to a mere 
17% of the total vote, is analogous to the implosion of PASOK. The other 
established parties, Fine Gael and Labour, stood together on their record in 
government, though campaigning separately. New challenger parties on the right 
(Renua) and on the centre-left (the Social Democrats) challenged their respective 
neighbour parties with a sharper policy focus. Labour also faced a threat from 
the dramatic gains in the polls made by Sinn Féin, which was now trying to 
broaden its niche support that had been based on strong nationalism, with a left-
wing challenger party appeal to those who felt most aggrieved at austerity 
measures. But Sinn Féin also posed a threat to Fianna Fáil’s attempts at electoral 
recovery, because it tried to cultivate a similar kind of populist, cross-class 
appeal as Fianna Fáil’s. To this end, Sinn Féin toned down earlier, more radical 
plans for sharply progressive income tax and wealth tax in its efforts to become a 
leading player in government formation. So a profile of party system 
fragmentation and the rise of challenger parties was in evidence in Ireland as 
elsewhere. 
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But the Irish electoral system permitted something rather different too, that is, 
the emergence of a sizeable number of representatives elected on their 
individual credentials, either representing small leftist parties or organizing into 
looser alliances of blocs, and accounting for about 25% of voters’ first 
preferences. The prospects of forming a stable government in the wake of the 
parliamentary general election scheduled for spring 2016 were likely to depend 
on the decisions of at least some of these representatives. These fragmented 
challenger parties and candidates in Ireland mobilised much of their support 
through campaigns of opposition to the new taxes and charges introduced 
during the years of austerity. Ireland’s poorly-developed revenue system had 
long failed to tax important assets such as housing, and payment for services and 
utilities such as waste collection and domestic water usage had not been clearly 
linked to levels of consumption. Under the terms of the loan agreement, Ireland 
was required to broaden its tax base and to raise new revenues from these and 
other sources. A Universal Social Charge (USC) was also mandated, to rationalise 
a complex set of rates and bands governing different types of social insurance 
and other levies. The defenders of the USC noted that it improved the visibility of 
higher earners to the revenue authorities because it was hard to avoid. But its 
regressive incidence was widely resented. 
 
Political dissent, in Hirschman’s formulation, can take the form of exit, voice, or 
loyalty. ‘Voice’ had, to some observers, been lacking in Irish politics – citizens 
seemed to reserve their dissent for the ballot box rather than taking to the 
streets as they did elsewhere in continental Europe (Naughton 2015; Pappas and 
O’Malley 2014). Demonstrations, marches, and direct action organised by 
‘challenger’ groups after 2011did not amount to mass action on a European 
scale. ‘Exit’ may have contributed to muting open expressions of dissatisfaction, 
since about 10% of its young population was estimated to have emigrated during 
the years of austerity. But this is not the whole story. Ireland certainly had 
grievances aplenty, mobilisers to act on them, and the opportunity to be heard 
(Kriesi 2014). The trade union movement had organised large-scale and well-
supported street demonstrations in the early phases of the crisis, in protest at 
direct public sector pay cuts, transfer payments, and spending on social services. 
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To forestall continued clashes, they were willing to enter into negotiations with 
both of the governments that had held power; the ensuing agreements converted 
‘voice’ into a grudging acquiescence, if not actual ‘loyalty’. The later waves of 
protest, organised by radical left organisations, mostly appealed to those 
sections of the electorate that did not feel represented by the trade unions – 
whether because they were unemployed, or because they perceived the unions’ 
actions and the Labour Party’s concerns to be more beneficial to public sector 
than to private sector employees.  
 
The political effects of austerity on Irish politics were therefore in many ways 
quite similar to those seen in the other periphery countries. But there was one 
striking point of difference. Unlike the rest of the Eurozone, the Irish economy in 
2014 and 2015 showed signs of renewed growth. The governing parties hoped 
that more jobs, more disposable income boosted by tax concessions, and some 
increased spending, would bring more voters round to supporting them in time 
for the 2016 elections. Protest vote intentions were strongest during the worst of 
the recession; an improvement in economic performance took some of the heat 
from the politics of opposition (Louwerse 2015). 
 
However, the recovery was experienced unevenly. The exporting sector bounced 
back, and many domestic firms proved quite resilient; but investment, especially 
in public infrastructure, housing, and services, starved by austerity, remained 
low. Many people continued to be angry about the terms of bank recapitalisation 
in 2010 under some duress from the international lenders. Yet bank lending 
remained highly constrained. The sizeable small and medium enterprise (SME) 
sector suffered from large debt overhang, and over 1,000 businesses closed 
during 2015. Ireland’s dysfunctional housing market developed many new 
problems. Very little new building had taken place during the recession, and in a 
relatively young population, this resulted in unaffordable high rents and pushed 
ever more people into homelessness. Meanwhile, home-owners with boom-time 
mortgages were often now on reduced earnings or without work and no-one was 
offering to bail out private sector debt. Social services were inadequate, health 
services were in chaos. But the capacity of the fragmented leftists to convert 
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dissatisfaction into protest, protest into votes, and votes into seats, let alone 
seats into bargaining capacity in government formation, was as yet untested. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have noted that Ireland’s experiences of austerity cannot be fully understood 
without recognizing that Ireland, along with the other periphery states in the 
Eurozone, is embedded in a broader European economy, and that the economic 
fortunes of the periphery are not independent of what happens elsewhere. 
Ireland’s budgetary policy continued to be shaped by newly tightened European 
fiscal rules, but Ireland began to escape the pervasive stagnation of the southern 
periphery because its productive activities were more closely integrated into the 
Anglo-European economy. Nonetheless, its recovery depended on the 
congruence of favourable conditions whose continuation were beyond the 
control of national government, such as the appreciation of the dollar and 
sterling relative to the Euro, low interest rates on still very high sovereign debt 
and private debt, low oil prices, and stability in the wider international economy, 
including China. 
 
We have also noted that across Europe, established party systems were coming 
under pressure in ways that were making existing forms of representative 
government more difficult. The economic crisis intensified these trends, but they 
had deeper secular roots in the slow decay of party identification among voters. 
Established parties were losing support, and the beneficiaries were new, 
challenger parties avowing a form of anti-politics, offering a new way of 
organizing, and promising a new set of priorities. Citizens’ trust in established 
political parties was at a low-point in most European countries, lower even than 
their trust in their national governments. The reason appears simple – 
increasingly, voters seemed to believe that it matters little for whom they vote, 
since the policies of the mainstream parties seemed all too similar. Hence the 
appeal of parties offering an alternative approach to politics.   
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The economic crisis may therefore have exposed something more fundamental 
about European politics, which is that political representation and accountability 
to voters is increasingly at odds with governments’ responsibilities toward 
actors outside the national territory: this is Peter Mair’s analysis (Mair 2014, 
2013). Governments incur obligations to comply with EU treaties and rules, but 
the legitimacy of the EU itself depends heavily on good economic performance. If 
the EU can offer no hope of a better future, Euroscepticism and even far-right 
nationalism can flourish at the domestic level (Scharpf 2014). Governments are 
also obliged to anticipate the responses of international financial markets to 
their policy choices. Together, these constraints mean that no single government 
has the capacity to adopt a heterodox policy stance (Dellepiane and Hardiman 
2012; Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Hardiman 2015). Greece’s attempts to alter the 
macroeconomic priorities of the EU in mid-2015 failed, and the terms of its new 
loan agreement were more severe than those which had facilitated the rise to 
power of SYRIZA in the first place.  
 
Across Europe, the individualisation of voting behaviour as older loyalties 
eroded, combined with an apparent lack of responsiveness of national parties to 
voter anxieties about unemployment, stagnating incomes, and debt, contributed 
to a growing sense that there was little to choose between parties. All of this fed 
into a wider disenchantment with and cynicism about politics itself. Political 
organisations that offered a politics of greater responsiveness to popular 
concerns, whether from the left or the right, began to do well in the polls. The left 
challenger parties in the periphery were not hostile to the EU or to EMU. But the 
rise of the extreme right from France to Greece, and the accession to power of 
the nationalist right in Hungary and Poland, articulated an alternative view of 
national interests that would put them increasingly at odds with the EU itself. To 
some, the European democratic project itself was entrapped by the technocratic 
logic of the market (Offe 2014). It remained to be seen whether European 
countries, and the EU itself, could ‘get the politics right by enabling citizens 
greater say over decision-making in ways that serve to rebuild trust while 
counteracting the rise of the extremes’ (Schmidt 2015, p.112). 
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